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WILL NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS WHO ARE REFUSED
VISITATION WITH CHILDREN ALSO BE TURNED AWAY FROM
U.S. COURTS?: JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN ACCESS CASES
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION IN CANTOR V. COHEN AND
OZALTIN V. OZALTIN
Melissa L. Thompson *
I. INTRODUCTION
Six-year-old Anna grew up in Sweden, living under one roof with
both of her parents, Lars and Natalie. After several weeks of arguing
that kept Anna up late into the night, Natalie filed for divorce and was
designated the "custodial parent." From then on Anna spent half of the
week with her mother, and the other half of the week with her father.
When Natalie discovered Lars had begun dating, Natalie made a plan to
move with Anna to the United States and to cut off contact with Lars.
Natalie had friends in Chicago who agreed to host Natalie and Anna
until Natalie was able to find a job. When Anna asked her mother why
Lars was not making the trip with them, Natalie told her that he had
found a new family and no longer loved them anymore. Natalie refused
to allow Lars any contact with Anna, and within days of their arrival in
the United States, Lars filed a petition for the return of Anna and flew to
the United States in hopes of reestablishing contact with his daughter.
Natalie prevented Lars from seeing Anna by concealing their location
and hiding her with friends. When Lars filed a petition for enforcement
of access to Anna based on the Swedish order providing for equal
parenting time, his petition was dismissed. Lars was told that The
Hague Convention did not protect his visitation rights and that he would
have to await the federal court's decision on his petition for Anna's
return. Left-behind parents, like Lars, who travel to the United States to
seek the return of their child, may find rights of access established by
their home country's custody order difficult to enforce.
On February 11, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, holding that the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) creates a private right of action to
enforce parental access rights provided for under The Hague
Convention.' This decision conflicts with existing law of the Fourth
Circuit established in Cantor v. Cohen, in which the Fourth Circuit held
* Associate Member, 2012-2013 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank her family for their support and her fellow law students and colleagues for their helpful
comments on various drafts of this paper.
1. Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2013).
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that ICARA does not empower U.S. courts to hear parents' claims
pursuing access rights.2
This Casenote examines the function of the Hague Convention where
a foreign parent seeks to enforce parental rights of access in the United
States under ICARA. Specifically, this discussion considers whether
U.S. courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a parent's claim
seeking to enforce rights of access in the U.S. pursuant to a foreign
court's custody order granting that parent rights of access or whether the
parent's only recourse is in state court under state visitation law. Part II
proceeds with a brief overview of the history and underlying goals of the
Hague Convention and introduces the concept of "access" claims under
the Hague Convention and its relevant U.S. statutory provisions. Part III
describes the divergent holdings of the Fourth and Second Circuit
Courts of Appeals and recounts the courts' analyses. Part IV evaluates
these decisions in light of legislative intent, statutory interpretation,
separation of powers, and public policy concerns. Part V concludes that
the decision of the Second Circuit should be adopted and recommends
that all actions seeking to enforce access rights should proceed in federal
court alongside actions seeking the child's return. Finally, this Casenote
contends that the issue of private rights of action under ICARA is ripe
for review by the U. S. Supreme Court.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of the Hague Convention of 1980
The Hague Convention of October 25, 1980 on the Civil Aspects of
International Abduction (The Hague Convention) 3 is an international
treaty, adopted by eighty-nine countries,4 which seeks "to secure the
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any
Contracting State; and to ensure that rights of custody and of access
2. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2006).
3. The Hague Convention originated from the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
which sets out to "work for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law." See
Information on The Hague Convention Conference on Private International Law, THE WORLD
ORGANISATION FOR CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-text.display&tid=4 (last visited July 15, 2013).
4. See Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction:
Members of the Organisation, THE WORLD ORGANISATION FOR CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-conventions.statusprint&
cid=24 (last visited July 15, 2013). The Hague Convention will likely soon have ninety contracting
states, with Kazakhstan as the most recent signatory. 90 Contracting States for the 1980 Hague Child
Abduction Convention after accession by Kazakhstan, THE WORLD ORGANISATION FOR CROSS-BORDER
CO-OPERATION IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act-events.
details&year-2013&varevent-312 (last visited July 15, 2013).
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under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the
other Contracting States."5 The drafters of the Hague Convention
sought to protect children from the harmful effects of international child
abduction by noncustodial parents attem ting to relocate in order to
"establish artificial jurisdictional links' to a perceived "friendlier
forum."7
The Hague Convention carries out its goal by instituting a policy of
deference to foreign legal systems, thereby removing any perceived
benefit of international child abduction to noncustodial parents.8
Although it is undisputed that any proper custody determination must be
based on the child's best interests, the Hague Convention leaves this
determination to the courts of the country of the child's "habitual
residence"9  rather than to the courts of the country of refuge.'0
Therefore, a noncustodial parent who flees with the child to a
contracting state of the Hague Convention will find that the "left-
behind" parent can have the courts of the refuge country order the child
returned to the home jurisdiction for a proper custody determination."
For this reason, the Hague Convention is best described as a
"jurisdiction-selection treaty" because it governs only where custody
determinations should be made without assessing the merits of the
custody dispute.' 2  In essence, the Hague Convention represents an
5. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter The Hague Convention].
6. Elisa P6rez-Vera, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION
CONVENTION, 11(1982), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf [hereinafter Pdrez-Vera
Report].
7. Abbot v. Abbot, 560 U.S. 1, 7 (2010); The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at pmbl.
8. See The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 1, 12; see also Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d
355 (2d Cir. 2013).
9. The Hague Convention itself does not define "habitual residence," but courts generally
broadly consider factors regarding intent (including the purchase of a home, the moving of belongings,
parental employment, and the location of bank accounts) and child acclimatization (child's age, length
of stay in the country, and school enrollment). For a full discussion of the various factors considered in
a "habitual residence" determination, see Jeff Atkinson, The Meaning of "Habitual Residence " Under
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and The Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 647 (2011).
10. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 8; see also JEREMY D. MORLEY, THE HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION:
PRACTICAL ISSUES AND PROCEDURES FOR FAMILY LAWYERS § 1.02 (American Bar Association 2012)
("The required assumption is that the custody determination made by the country of the child's habitual
residence would be the same as that of the refuge country. Some scholars argue that although all courts
vow that the determination is based on the 'best interests of the child,' there is often a lack of
uniformity. These concerns beg the question of whether The Hague Convention is truly solely
jurisdictional in nature, or whether in its attempt to stay out of the realm of determining the underlying
merits of a custody battle, The Hague Convention in fact disrupts uniformity.").
11. See The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at art. 12.
12. See MORLEY, supra note 10, § 1.04.
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agreement among member nations3 to disallow international kidnapping
as a means of forum shopping for a more sympathetic court, calling
instead for the return of children to their home country for
determinations of custody.
Article 6 of the Hague Convention vests responsibility for the
enforcement of protections afforded by the Hague Convention within
the borders of each contracting state in that state's Central Authority.14
A contracting state's Central Authority has the following
responsibilities:
discover[ing] the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully
removed or retained; . .. initiat[ing] or facilitat[ing] the institution of
judicial or administrative proceedings with a view to obtaining the return
of the child, and, in a proper case, mak[ing] arrangements for organising
or securing the effective exercise of rights of access; . . . [and] provid[ing]
or facilitat[ing] the provision of legal aid and advice.
The forty-five Articles of the Hague Convention attempt to mitigate
the negative impact of international abduction on child victims by
providing for two possible remedies in each of its eighty-nine
contracting states: an Order for Return of the Child, addressed in Article
12, and an Order Enforcing Access Rights (i.e. visitation rights),
addressed in Article 21.'l
1. Order for Return of the Child
The most publicized and widely known aspect of the Hague
Convention is its grant of authority to administrative and judicial
officials to order the return of children to their home country if
wrongfully removed from that country or wrongfully retained in another
contracting nation. The Hague Convention directs claims for securing
the return of a child to the Central Authority of the country of the child's
13. MORLEY, supra note 10, § 1.09.
To institute a case under the Hague Convention, the petitioner must, as a threshold issue,
establish that the Convention was in force at the time of the alleged wrongful removal or
wrongful retention in both the country of the child's "habitual residence" as well as in the
country in which the child is currently located. Although the Hague Convention has eighty-nine
member nations, the Hague Convention is not necessarily in force between two given member
nations, as some states have not accepted the accessions of other contracting states. If a state
from which a child is taken is not found to be the child's habitual residence, the return remedy of
the Convention is not available.
Id
14. The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at art. 6.
15. Id. at arts. 7(a), (0, (g).
16. See id at arts. 12, 21.
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habitual residence1 7 and requires that Central Authority to immediately
transmit the petition to the Central Authority of the contracting state in
which the child is believed to be located.' 8 The Central Authority of the
refuge country must then "take ... all ap ropriate measures in order to
obtain the voluntary return of the child."' 9 If the child is not returned
voluntarily, the petitioning parent may initiate judicial or administrative
proceedings in the refuge county.20
Pursuant to Article 12 of the Hague Convention, the judicial or
administrative authority of the refuge country is required to make certain
findings before issuing an order for the return of a child. These findings
include determining that the child has been "wrongfully removed" 21 and
that "a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the
wrongful removal or retention." 22 If more than one year has lapsed, the
judicial or administrative authority should still order the return of the
child unless the child is "now settled in its new environment." 2 3
The Hague Convention provides the parent who removed the child,
referred to as the "respondent parent," with several avenues to challenge
the petition for return of the child, even if the child was wrongfully
removed or retained under the Hague Convention.24 If the child is at
17. Id. at art. 8 ("Any person, institution, or other body claiming that a child has been removed
or retained in breach of custody rights may apply either to the Central Authority of the child's habitual
residence or to the Central Authority of any other Contracting State for assistance in securing the return
of the child.").
18. Id. at art. 9 ("If the Central Authority which receives an application referred to in Article 8
has reason to believe that the child is in another Contracting State, it shall directly and without delay
transmit the application to the Central Authority of that Contracting State and inform the requesting
Central Authority, or the applicant, as the case may be.").
19. Id. at art. 10 ("The Central Authority of the State where the child is shall take or cause to be
taken all appropriate measures in order to obtain the voluntary return of the child.").
20. See id at art. 11 ("The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act
expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children. If the judicial or administrative authority
concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the
proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if
asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the
reasons for the delay.").
21. Article 3 of the Hague Convention defines a removal or retention of a child as "wrongful" if
"it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person ... under the law of the State in which the
child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention," and "at the time of the
removal or retention those rights were actually exercised . .. or would have been so exercised but for the
removal or retention." Id. at art. 3.
22. Id. at art. 12 ("[A]t the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or
administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has
elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention .... ).
23. Id. at art. 12 ("The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have
been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year . . . shall also order the return of the
child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.").
24. See Nrez-Vera Report, supra note 6, M 27-34.
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least sixteen years old, the Hague Convention ceases to apply.25
Furthermore, if the authority finds that the child is sufficiently mature
and of an appropriate age, the authority may consider the child's wishes
regarding the petition for return.26 The Hague Convention also provides
for a human rights exception, which allows the authority to refuse to
return the child if doing so would violate "fundamental principles of the
requested State relating to the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 27
Finally, the Hague Convention provides for two affirmative defenses
that, if proven by the parent opposing the return order, allow the
authority to use its discretion in ordering the return of the child.28  First,
the respondent parent may seek to prove that the petitioner parent was
"not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of the removal or
retention, or has consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal
or retention." 29  Second, if the respondent parent can convince the
authority that "there is a grave risk that [the child's] return would expose
the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child
in an intolerable situation," the authority is not obligated to order the
return of the child.30
2. Order to Enforce Rights of Access
In addition to protecting the rights of custodial parents through the
Hague Convention's return of the child remedy, the drafters also set out
to protect the rights of noncustodial parents through the enforcement of
rights of access,3' defined as "the right[s] to take a child for a limited
period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence."32
25. The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at art. 4 ("The Convention shall apply to any child who
was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights.
The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.").
26. Id. at art. 13 ("The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of
the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity
at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.").
27. Id at art. 20 ("The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if
this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.").
28. Id. at art. 13 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or
administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person,
institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that . . .
29. Id. at art. 13(a).
30. Id at art. 13(b). For a full discussion of the "grave risk of harm" exception, see Theresa A.
Spinillo, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of International Child Abduction: An Analysis of
the Grave Risk ofHarm Defense, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 129 (2001).
31. See The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 7(f) and 21 (providing that Central
Authority entities should remove barriers to effective access rights of noncustodial parents).
32. Id at art. 5(b).
1010 [VOL. 82
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Although the Hague Convention directs that "[a]n application to
make arrangements for organising or securing the effective exercise of
rights of access may be presented to the Central Authorities of the
Contracting States in the same way as an application for the return of a
child,"33 parents seeking to enforce access rights do not have the return
of the child remedy at their disposal. 34  This is true even if a "left-
behind" parent had access rights in the home country, because the return
of the child remedy is available only if the removal or retention of the
child is deemed "wrongful," and removal or retention is "wrongful"
only if it is a breach of custody rights.35
Rights of access are governed by Article 21 of the Hague Convention,
which states in its entirety:
An application to make arrangements for organising or securing the
effective exercise of rights of access may be presented to the Central
Authorities of the Contracting States in the same way as an application
for the return of a child. The Central Authorities are bound by the
obligations of co-operation which are set forth in Article 7 to promote the
peaceful enjoyment of access rights and the fulfilment of any conditions
to which the exercise of those rights may be subject. The Central
Authorities shall take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to
the exercise of such rights. The Central Authorities, either directly or
through intermediaries, may initiate or assist in the institution of
proceedings with a view to organising or protecting these rights and
securing respect for the conditions to which the exercise of these rights
may be subject.36
Unfortunately, the vague language of Article 21 has led to
contradictory enforcement procedures among contracting states.
Whereas the provisions governing the return remedy explain the judicial
proceedings in adequate detail, Article 21's language is ambiguous as to
the judicial enforcement of access rights. The language permits some
countries to interpret Article 21 as granting broad discretion in styling
judicial enforcement of rights of access while other countries have
instead interpreted the lack of explicit judicial authority as providing a
33. Id. at art. 21.
34. Linda Silberman, Hague International Child Abduction Convention: A Progress Report, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 247-48 (1994).
35. The Hague Convention defines "custody rights" as "rights relating to the care of the person
of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence." The Hague
Convention, supra note 5, at art. 5(a). In contrast, the Hague Convention defines "access rights" as "the
right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence." Id
at art. 5(b). A court applying the Hague Convention has to analyze whether the order set forth by the
country of the child's habitual residence qualifies as granting "custody rights" pursuant to the Hague
Convention.
36. Id. at art. 21.
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judicial remedy within their nation.37
Aside from the plain language of Article 21, the only guidance
available regarding the scope of judicial authority is in the legislative
history of the Hague Convention, which makes clear that the Hague
Convention should not be read as authorizing courts to decide the merits
of any custody issue.
B. Enforcement of the Hague Convention's Guarantee ofRights of
Access in the United States: The International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (ICARA) and Rights ofAccess
In April 1988, upon recognition that "[i]nternational abductions and
retentions of children [were] increasing, and [that] only concerted
cooperation pursuant to an international agreement [could] effectively
combat this problem,"38 Congress adopted the Hague Convention,
implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA)39 and named the U.S. Department of State as the Central
Authority.40 Although ICARA adds little by way of substance, it
directly incorporates all provisions of the Hague Convention and
functions to enforce the legal rights and procedures established by the
treaty, specifically "the prompt return of children who have been
wrongfully removed or retained, as well as ... securing the exercise of
visitation rights."41 ICARA defines the rights of access addressed under
the Hague Convention as "visitation rights."42
Because the Hague Convention does not dictate the jurisdictional
framework for the resolution of access cases in the contracting states,
the jurisdictional provisions in ICARA are at the center of the issue
addressed in this Casenote. ICARA explicitly states that its purpose is
"to establish procedures for the implementation of the Convention in the
United States" 43 and that ICARA should be construed as being "in
addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of the [Hague]
37. See MORLEY, supra note 10, § 1.10.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(3) (2013).
39. ICARA was explicitly enacted to implement the Hague Convention. See International Child
Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(1) (2012) ("It is the purpose of this chapter to establish
procedures for the implementation of the Convention in the United States.").
40. Exec. Order No. 12648, 53 Fed. Reg. 30637 (Aug. 11, 1988) ("The Department of State is
hereby designated as the Central Authority of the United States for purposes of the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The Secretary of State is hereby authorized and
empowered, in accordance with such regulations as he may prescribe, to perform all lawful acts that
may be necessary and proper in order to execute the functions of the Central Authority in a timely and
efficient manner.").
41. 42 U.S.C.§ 11601(a)(4) (2012).
42. Id. § 11602(7).
43. Id. § ll601(b)(1).
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Convention."
ICARA specifically states in 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) that:
Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the Convention
for the return of a child or for arrangements for organizing or securing the
effective exercise of rights of access to a child may do so by commencing
a civil action by filing a petition for relief sought in any court which has
jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise its
jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition
is filed.45
Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) states that "[t]he courts of the
States and the United States district courts shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention."46
Some scholars argue that these provisions create a judicial remedy for
the enforcement of all rights protected by the Hague Convention,
including access rights.47 Proponents of this idea focus on the explicit
language in the statute referring to the "exercise of rights of access.',4
Opponents argue that Congress intentionally declined to provide a
private right of action to enforce rights of access. 49 They argue that
Article 21 of the Hague Convention does not provide a judicial remedy
for rights of access; therefore, ICARA's grant of jurisdiction cannot
create a private right of action in access cases because the action does
not "aris[e] under the Convention."o
This Casenote analyzes these competing interpretations and questions
whether a noncustodial parent seeking to enforce rights of access has a
private right of action under ICARA or whether the parent must resort to
filing a separate lawsuit in state court pursuant to state family law
instead of federal law.
In support of their respective interpretations, both proponents and
opponents of a federal right of action in access cases proffer ICARA's
legislative history as evidence that Congress shared their understanding
of ICARA's provisions. Unfortunately, ICARA's legislative history,
much like the legislative history of the Hague Convention, reveals only
that Congress intended not to grant U.S. courts any authority to consider
the underlying merits of custody disputes.s'
Also commonly referenced in this debate is a 1986 State Department
44. Id § 11601(b)(2).
45. Id. § 11603(b) (emphasis added).
46. Id. § 11603(a) (emphasis added).
47. See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2013).
48. Id. at 372.
49. See Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2006).
50. Id. at 200.
51. See id. at 202-04.
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Notice issued after President Reagan submitted the Hague Convention
to the U.S. Senate and recommended ratification.52 Following an
explanation of the order for the return of the child remedy, the Notice
stated that
"[a]ccess rights," which are synonymous with "visitation rights," are also
protected by the Convention, but to a lesser extent than custody rights.
While the Convention preamble and Article 1(b) articulate the
Convention objective of ensuring that rights of access under the law of
one state are respected in other Contracting States, the remedies for
breach of access rights ... do not include the return remedy provided for
in Article 12.53
The competing interpretations among U.S. scholars regarding
ICARA's grant of judicial authority in rights of access cases recently
came to the forefront when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Ozaltin v. Ozaltin and held that federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear access cases.54 This decision conflicts with the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Cantor v. Cohen that federal courts do not
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear access cases because ICARA
does not provide a private right of action to parents seeking to enforce
access rights. 5
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Fourth Circuit and Cantor v. Cohen
In Cantor v. Cohen, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed a district court's dismissal of a mother's action seeking access
to her minor children on the grounds that ICARA does not provide a
federal right of action for access claims.56
Sarah Claudia Aragon Cantor and Andrew Cohen married in Israel in
April 1990.57 The couple had four children together: two girls, R.C. and
A.C., and two boys I.C. and Y.C.58 Ms. Cantor and Mr. Cohen divorced
in July 1998 in an Israeli Rabbinical Court, and the accompanying
divorce decree provided that Ms. Cantor would have custody of the two
younger children, Y.C. and R.C., while Mr. Cohen would have custody
52. Department of State Text and Legal Analysis of Hague Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494-01
(Mar. 26, 1986).
53. Id.
54. Czaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 378 (2d Cir. 2013).
55. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 206.
56. Id. at 197.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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of the two older children, A.C. and I.C. 59
In September 1998, the parties determined that Ms. Cantor should
have custody of their two daughters and that Mr. Cohen should have
custody of their two sons. 60 Pursuant to this agreement, Ms. Cantor
relinquished her custody of Y.C. and retained custody of A.C. 1 In June
1999, Ms. Cantor initiated proceedings in the Israeli Rabbinical Court to
modify the parties' divorce decree accordingly. 62 In the meantime, just
one month later in July 1999, Mr. Cohen joined the U.S. Air Force
Chaplaincy as an ordained Rabbi and was scheduled to attend training
for the new position in the United States. 63 The Israeli Rabbinical Court
issued the second divorce decree in January 2000, granting Ms. Cantor
custody of their daughters and Mr. Cohen custody of their sons.64 Under
the second decree, Ms. Cantor also retained temporary custody of their
sons while Mr. Cohen attended training in the United States for
approximately nine months.6 5
In July 2002, the Israeli Rabbinical Court issued a third divorce
decree, which provided that although both parties would retain custody
of their children of the same gender, A.C., one of their daughters, would
reside "on an extended visit" with her brothers and Mr. Cohen in
Germany while he was stationed there with the U.S. Air Force.66 The
third decree provided that Mr. Cohen would pay half of Ms. Cantor's
travel expenses to Germany approximately once every two months for
her to visit with Y.C., I.C., and A.C. Mr. Cohen was also required to
bring the children to Israel at least twice a year and to allow the children
to contact Ms. Cohen by phone three times per week. 8 Importantly, the
decree did not relinquish custody of A.C. to Mr. Cohen, nor did it
provide a return date to Israel for A.C. 69
By December 2002, both R.C. and Ms. Cantor were dissatisfied with
R.C.'s current school, and Ms. Cantor and Mr. Cohen agreed that R.C.,
the only child remaining in Israel with Ms. Cantor, would thrive in
Germany with her siblings and Mr. Cohen.70 R.C. moved to Germany to
59. Id
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 197-98.
67. Id at 198.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. Id
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live with her siblings and her father.7'
After completing his duty in Germany in April 2004, Mr. Cohen
reported back to the United States.72 In July 2004, all four children
moved with Mr. Cohen to Silver Spring, Maryland.
Ms. Cantor, who remained in Israel, filed a verified petition for return
of the children and for access to the children in October 2004 in the
U.S. 74  Mr. Cohen filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court
dismissed the complaint to the extent that it requested access to the
children, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear access claims
relating to I.C. and Y.C., the parties' sons of whom Mr. Cohen retained
custody. Ms. Cantor then filed a motion for final judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) on the access claims and for
clarification of the access claim as to A.C., of whom she retained
custody. The district court granted her motion and certified as a final
judgment its dismissal of all access claims, including as to A.C.77
Ms. Cantor appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, in a 2-1
decision,7 8 the district court's dismissal of the access claims, finding that
ICARA only lends jurisdiction to U.S. courts to determine rights
afforded by the Hague Convention, which, the court found, does not
provide for a judicial remedy for denial of access rights.79 The court
reached this conclusion by relying on the language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 11601(b)(4), which states that "[t]he Convention and this chapter
empower courts in the United States to determine only rights under the
Convention . . . . 8 o The court found that those "rights under the
Convention," do not include "presentation to a judicial authority" in
Article 21 right of access cases.8 ' Article 21's lack of language for a
judicial remedy stands in contrast, the court noted, to Article 12's
explicit grant of judicial authority in wrongful removal or retention
cases.82
Furthermore, the court emphasized that where ICARA and Articles
12, 13, and 20 of the Hague Convention offer affirmative defenses for
courts to consider in wrongful removal cases, none are explicitly
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. For a more in-depth discussion of Judge Traxler's dissent, see infra Part I.B.
79. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 206.
80. Id. at 199 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1 1601(b)(4) (2013)).
81. Id. at 200.
82. Id
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presented in Article 2 1.83 The court remarked that "[i]t is difficult to
believe that federal courts could entertain access claims, yet would be
left powerless to consider any defenses which concern the safety or the
best interests of a child."84 Therefore, the court concluded that Congress
did not intend to provide a federal right of action in Article 21 access
cases.
In addition to the plain language interpretation proffered by the court,the court presented additional support for its holding based on the
legislative history of ICARA and on general policy arguments against
the fitness of federal courts to decide child custody disputes. The court
quoted portions of the transcript from the House floor that offered
further proof that ICARA was intended to protect only the rights
provided for by the Hague Convention and does not extend to any
"underlying custody disputes."85  The court attempted to show that
Congress's intent was to avoid custody disputes "embroil[ing] the
federal courts." 86 Furthermore, the court noted that "federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction and generally abstain from hearing child
custody matters" and that except for the explicit grant of authority by
ICARA over wrongful removal and return cases, "other child custody
matters, including access claims, would be better handled by the state
courts which have the experience to deal with this specific area of the
law."87
Finally, the court observed that Ms. Cantor was not without remedy.88
Ms. Cantor could have attempted to enforce her access rights under
ICARA by initiating administrative proceedings with the U.S.
Department of State or under Maryland visitation law by filing suit in
Maryland state court.89
B. The Second Circuit in Ozaltin v. Ozaltin
In Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, Mr. Nurretin Ozaltin sought the return of his
two minor children to Turkey from New York, where the children were
living with their mother, Ms. Zeynep Tekiner Ozaltin, and sought
83. Id at 204.
84. Id
85. Id at 202-05.
86. Id at 202.
87. Id at 202.
88. Id. at 206. Note also that the Hague Convention provides courts with authority to direct the
person who removed or retained the child, or who prevented the exercise of rights of access, to pay
necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the applicant, including travel expenses, any costs
incurred or payments made for locating the child, the costs of legal representation of the applicant, and
those of returning the child. The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at art. 26.
89. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 206.
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enforcement of his access rights while the children remained in New
York pending the proceedings for their return.90
Mr. and Ms. Ozaltin married in 2001 and had two daughters, S.E.O.
and Y.O., ages nine and seven respectively at the time of Ms. Ozaltin's
appeal to the Second Circuit.91 Both parents and both children were
dual citizens of Turkey and the United States.92 Ms. Ozaltin contended
that in December 2010, she and Mr. Ozaltin had an argument stemming
from his alleged drinking problem during which Mr. Ozaltin threatened
Ms. Ozaltin and ordered her to leave with the children.93 Ms. Ozaltin
quickly travelled with the children to New York, where they stayed with
her family.94 Ms. Ozaltin claimed that she spoke with Mr. Ozaltin
during a layover on their trip and that he told her to remain in the United
States with the children.95
Mr. Ozaltin filed an application with the Turkish Ministry of Justice
in early January 2011 seeking the return of the parties' daughters to
Turkey under the Hague Convention.96 Ms. Ozaltin filed an ex parte
application with the Second Family Court in Usk Dar, resulting in a
court protective order barring Mr. Ozaltin from "threatening or
disturbing [Ms. Ozaltin] and the children." 97  Ms. Ozaltin initiated
divorce proceedings with the Turkish court in early February 2011, and
the court's temporary orders required Mr. Ozaltin to make spousal
support payments to Ms. Ozaltin.9
In May 2011, Mr. Ozaltin petitioned the Turkish court for temporary
custody or, in the alternative, for an order requiring the children's return
to Turkey and the rights to access his daughters in the meantime. 99 The
court rejected Mr. Ozaltin's petition for custody but awarded him
"possession of the children from 10 am on Saturdays until 12 pm on
Sundays every first and third weeks of the month if he goes to the
USA."' Mr. Ozaltin travelled to New York and exercised these rights
of access between May and August 2011.101 In July 2011, the Turkish
court ordered that Mr. Ozaltin was permitted to exercise extended
parenting time with the children outside of the United States from
90. Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 357 (2d Cir. 2013).
91. Id. at 360.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 360-61.
98. Id. at 361.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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August 18, 2011 until September 1, 2011.102
After flying his daughters back to Turkey on August 28, 2011, Mr.
Ozaltin petitioned the Turkish court to extend his parenting time for one
month. 03  The court denied Mr. Ozaltin's request, but he retained
physical custody of the children nevertheless.1 04 After finding that Mr.
Ozaltin had "acted in bad faith," the Turkish court issued two orders
demanding that Mr. Ozaltin return the children and their passports to
Ms. Ozaltin.' 05 Mr. Ozaltin finally returned the children to Ms. Ozaltin,
who had since travelled to Turkey, on September 18, 2011.106 Ms.
Ozaltin could not immediately return to New York with her children
because Mr. Ozaltin had apparently lost the children's passports, but
they finally returned to New York on November 4, 2011.0
Ms. Ozaltin denied Mr. Ozaltin any access to the children once she
returned to New York.' In March 2012, the Turkish court rejected a
second request by Mr. Ozaltin for temporary custody but again ordered
that Ms. Ozaltin permit his weekend visitations with the children.' 09
Mr. Ozaltin next instituted proceedings in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York pursuant to ICARA and the Hague
Convention, seeking an order enforcing his rights of access under
Article 21, an order for the return of the children to Turkey under Article
12, and a cost award under Article 26.o10 The district court ordered that
Ms. Ozaltin permit Mr. Ozaltin the rights of access ordered by the
Turkish court, that the children remain in the state of New York during
the pendency of the proceedings and that the children's U.S. passports
be surrendered to the court."
The district court held two hearings, at which both parents presented
extensive evidence and offered testimony of Turkish legal experts. 112 In
June 2012, the district court found that the removal of the children from
Turkey was wrongful and ordered their return at the conclusion of the
school year." 3 The order also awarded Mr. Ozaltin "any 'necessary
expenses' incurred in connection with the suit.""14 In the interim, the
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id
107. Id.
108. Id. at 362.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id. at 363.
113. Id. at 364.
114. Id. at 365.
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district court ordered Ms. Ozaltin to comply with the Turkish court's
order granting Mr. Ozaltin rights of access despite her contention that
the district court lacked jurisdiction over access claims under ICARA."'
Ms. Ozaltin appealed the district court's visitation order and costs
award on grounds that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over ICARA claims seeking to enforce rights of access." 6
Ms. Ozaltin argued that Article 21 of the Hague Convention makes no
mention of judicial remedies, and thus, judicial remedies are unavailable
under ICARA.117
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking to enforce
rights of access under ICARA." 8 As support for its decision, the court
maintained that "[tihe statutory basis for a federal right of action" in
these cases "could hardly be clearer.""' 9 The court read ICARA to
"straightforwardly establish that a petitioner may 'initiate judicial
proceedings under the Convention ... for organizing or securing the
effective exercise of rights of access to a child,' and that 'United States
district courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction' over such
actions."' 20
The court distinguished its analysis from Cantor, explaining that the
Cantor court read Article 21 to say that "access rights can only be
vindicated by applying to The State Department," without attention to
the use of the word "may."'21 In rejecting this approach, the court
emphasized Article 29 of the Hague Convention, which reveals the
drafters' intention that the Central Authority remedy be nonexclusive in
nature:
This Convention shall not preclude any person ... who claims that there
has been a breach of custody or access rights within the meaning of
Article 3 or 21 from applying directly to the judicial or administrative
authorities of a Contracting State, whether or not under the provisions of
this Convention.122
As further evidence that Congress never intended ICARA to restrict
these claims to administrative actions pursued through the Central
Authority, the court pointed out that the member countries' Central
115. Id.
116. Id. at 365-66.
117. Id. at 366.
118. Id. at 378.
119. Id.at372.
120. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2013)).
121. Id. at 373.
122. Id. (quoting The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at art. 29).
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Authority offices are not equipped to enforce rights of access.123 1The
Central Authority is intended to offer "facilitative services," including
helping to locate the child, assisting with initiation of judicial or
administrative proceedings, and identifying proper counsel in the
relevant jurisdiction.124 The U.S. State Department, for example, lacks
any independent power to enforce access rights.125
For these reasons, the court held, in contrast with the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Cantor v. Cohen, that Article 21 does not mandate that
efforts to secure the right of access may be pursued only via application
to the member country's Central Authority, because the "facilitative role
that Central Authorities assume ... does not displace or inhibit the
ability of a party to vindicate his or her rights directly in federal or state
court under § 11603(b)."l 26
The court acknowledged criticism that Article 21 of the Hague
Convention lacks sufficient enforcement power.127 The court responded
by stating that even if a judicial remedy for enforcing rights of access is
not required by Article 21, ICARA unambiguously creates a judicial
remedy, which is not inconsistent with the Hague Convention.128
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Interpretation
Although Cantor's strict plain language interpretation of ICARA has
gained some support as a wise policy decision that will reduce federal
court caseloads, the Cantor approach fails to account for ICARA's
explicit grant of judicial authority and for the spirit of both ICARA and
its implementing treaty, the Hague Convention.
The language of Article 21 and the Hague Convention in general is
admittedly vague as to particular remedies available in access cases, and
many contracting states have acknowledged this ambiguity. It was
perhaps the intent of the Convention's drafters to leave enforcement of
access rights to the various levels of the contracting states' legal
systems. Nonetheless, any lack of clarity with respect to access cases
under the Hague Convention should not present an obstacle to parents
seeking to enforce rights of access in the United States. Rights of access
cases brought in the U.S. are initiated pursuant to ICARA, and therefore,
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 373-74.
126. Id. at 374.
127. Id.
128. Id.
17
Thompson: Will Noncustodial Parents Who are Refused Visitation with Childre
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
the statutory authority governing these claims is 42 U.S.C. § 11601, et
seq., not Article 21 of the Hague Convention. This is not to say that the
spirit of the Hague Convention is irrelevant or unimportant to this
analysis but only to point out that the ambiguous jurisdictional language
of the Hague Convention need not muddle the clear-cut jurisdictional
grants in ICARA.
ICARA explicitly states that
[a]ny person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the Convention
for . .. arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of
rights of access to a child may do so by commencing a civil action by
filing a petition ... in any court which has jurisdiction . . . .129
In the face of this unambiguous statutory language, which clearly
creates a private right of action, proponents of the Cantor approach
argue that another provision of ICARA forecloses a judicial remedy in
access cases. Section 11603(a) reads, "[t]he courts of the States and the
United States district courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction of
actions arising under the Convention."' 30 They argue that because the
Hague Convention does not explicitly create a judicial remedy for
Article 21 access cases and because ICARA purports to provide a
private right of action only for those actions "arising under the
Convention," parents seeking to enforce rights of access in the U.S. have
no judicial remedy under ICARA.
This argument conflates remedies provided for by the Hague
Convention with rights that the Hague Convention protects. Although
the Hague Convention arguably does not create a private right of action
in access cases, the Hague Convention unquestionably protects rights of
access. In fact, Article 1 of the Hague Convention identifies as a
purpose "to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of
one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting
States."' Consequently, ICARA's grant of a private right of action in
access cases is not inconsistent with § 11603(a) because rights of access
are explicitly protected by the Hague Convention. Furthermore,
proponents of the Cantor approach fail to consider the ICARA provision
stating that ICARA should be read "in addition to and not in lieu of the
provisions of the Convention."' 3 2
Not only is a private right of action in access cases not prohibited by
ICARA, it is specifically provided for throughout the various provisions.
Section 11603(b) is entitled "judicial remedies," and § 11603(e)(1)(B)
129. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2013).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2013).
131. The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at art. 1.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1 601(b)(2) (2013).
1022 [VOL. 82
18
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/10
2014] JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN ACCESS CASES UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENHON 1023
provides for a burden of proof provision specific to petitioners seeking
to enforce access rights:
A petitioner in an action brought under [ICARA based on authority from
The Hague Convention] shall establish by a preponderance of the
evidence ... in the case of an action for arrangements for organizing or
securing the effective exercise of rights of access, that the petitioner has
such rights.' 33
Proponents of the Cantor approach next argue that even if ICARA
may provide a private right of action, Congress did not intend for
ICARA to staunchly protect rights of access. In support of this
argument, they point to the "low" placement of the enforcement of
access rights in the fourth subparagraph of ICARA's "Findings" section.
This argument is not persuasive, however, because it fails to explain the
substance of the preceding provisions. None of the first three
subsections of § 11601(a) identifies any of the protected rights, but
instead, they explain why Congress believed legislation of this nature
was necessary in the first place:
(1) [t]he international abduction or wrongful retention of children is
harmful to their well-being; (2) [p]ersons should not be permitted to
obtain custody of children by virtue of their wrongful removal or
retention; [and] (3) [i]ntemational abductions and retentions of children
are increasing, and only concerted cooperation pursuant to an
international agreement can effectively combat this problem.134
The fourth subsection of § 11601(a) identifies both remedies available
under ICARA: the return of children who are wrongfully removed or
retained and the enforcement of rights of access for noncustodial parents
where visitation is denied by the custodial parent.
As further support for the proposition that Congress did not intend to
allow courts to enforce access rights under ICARA, proponents of the
Cantor approach cite to the U.S. State Department's 1986 Notice which
stated that rights of access "are also protected by the Convention, but to
a lesser extent than custody rights,"' 5 and that "the remedies for breach
of access rights ... do not include the return remedy provided for in
Article 12."l36
Proponents of the Cantor approach are correct in suggesting that the
return of the child order is the ICARA remedy with the "most teeth"
and that a denial of rights of access is not generally grounds for a return
133. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(B) (2013).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1 1601(a)(l)-(3) (2013).
135. Department of State Legal Analysis of Hague Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494-01 (Mar. 26,
1986).
136. Id.
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order. However, the fact that wrongful removal or retention claims call
for the more powerful remedy does not minimize the importance of
other rights protected by ICARA. Had Congress wanted to recognize
the enforcement of access rights as an aspirational objective but still
deprive courts of executing any remedy, it could have easily done so.
Instead, Congress repeatedly provided support for a private right of
action in rights of access cases.
B. Legislative Intent and Custody Determinations
Proponents of the Cantor approach also look to legislative history for
support in arguing that Congress did not aim to create a private right of
action for parents seeking to enforce rights of access under ICARA. As
support, they state, validly, that Congress was strongly opposed to any
interpretation of ICARA permitting federal courts to decide the merits of
any custody case. The drafters of the Hague Convention were equally
clear on this point, rejecting any interpretation of its provisions that
would permit contracting states' courts to consider the underlying merits
of custody disputes. Most scholars would agree that custody
determinations are properly left to a state's family or domestic relations
courts, and that the Hague Convention and ICARA call chiefly for legal
determinations that require as little consideration of the merits of the
case as possible.
The Cantor proponents' legislative intent argument is unconvincing
because it does not explain why rights of access cases "require
consideration of the merits of the custody dispute." Instead, the judicial
determination required to make the requisite findings to order the
enforcement of a parent's rights of access is almost purely legal. The
necessary inquiry in access cases is limited to whether "the petitioner
has such [access] rights."' 37 Put simply, the court must consider only
whether a valid, foreign custody order for visitation exists and whether
those rights of access are being violated, "not whether the petitioning
parent is better suited to serve as custodian."' 3 8 As Justice Traxler
remarked in his dissent in Cantor, "[tihis limited inquiry does not
require federal courts to plumb the depths of family law."
In contrast, U.S. federal courts deciding petitions for the return of a
child are required to delve into questions of fact normally reserved for
the states' family or domestic relations courts. For example, in deciding
a return case, the court must consider, by way of affirmative defenses,
whether the child is "well settled" in the U.S. and whether the child may
137. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e) (2013).
138. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 207 (4th Cir. 2006) (Traxler, J., dissenting).
139. Id at 212 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
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suffer a grave risk of harm if returned to its country of habitual
residence. In this way, a federal court's decision in return cases is not
wholly a legal determination. However, proponents of the Cantor
approach undoubtedly agree that these findings required in return cases
are soundly within the province of the federal courts under the
jurisdictional grants in ICARA. By this logic, asking federal courts to
decide access cases, which arguably require a more purely legal analysis
than return cases, would by no means embroil the federal courts with
family law questions, which all agree are best left to state courts.
C. Public Policy
The underlying essence of both the Hague Convention and ICARA is
an international, concerted attempt to protect children across the globe
from the harmful effects of international child abduction. With
increased ease of travel, international marriages, and children with dual
citizenship and passports, this problem is not likely to subside on its
own. Considering the ruinous effects of tearing a child away from one
parent, even if only for a limited time, the United States should adopt
the Second Circuit's approach and allow parents who have been denied
access to their children, who are located, rightfully or wrongfully, in the
United States, the remedy of a private right of action in a U.S. court to
enforce their rights of access.
And if the plain language of ICARA and the concerns for the child at
the center of such a case are insufficient, providing parents a private
right of action to enforce rights of access under ICARA is a sensible and
reasonable approach. More often than not, the left-behind parent
concurrently seeks a return order and, either in the alternative or during
the pendency of the return case, an order enforcing rights of access. To
ask parents, most of whom are presumably neither U.S. citizens nor
experts of the U.S. legal system, to pursue these remedies in separate
courts under separate legal authority would be unreasonable and
prohibitive of enforcement of rights of access protected by the Hague
Convention and ICARA.
Most importantly, providing parents a private right of action to seek
enforcement of their rights of access furthers a primary goal of the
Hague Convention-mitigating the harmful effects on children by
maintaining the status quo. Depriving the left-behind parent of a
nationally uniform avenue to enforce rights of access will inevitably
result in longer periods of time during which the child has no contact
with the parent. In particular, a left-behind parent's chances of quick
resolution are best if that parent initiates the proceedings in federal
district court. Federal courts have the resources to operate under a
21
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stricter timeline than the average state domestic relations court. In fact,
the Hague Convention requires that courts "act expeditiously in
proceedings for the return of children," 140 and suggests that a court
should reach a decision within only six weeks of a petition.
Furthermore, federal district court judges are generally better equipped
to interpret foreign custody orders and federal law than state court
judges.
Related to the goal of minimizing the harmful effects on children
entangled in an international custody dispute is the objective of refusing
to reward international child abduction by allowing the fleeing parent
the benefit of another country's laws. If a fleeing parent knows that
U.S. law will allow the fleeing parent to cut off all communication
between the left-behind parent and the child during the course of a
return case, the U.S. is perpetuating the problem of international child
abduction and is providing an incentive for parents to flee to the U.S. If
ICARA's provisions for securing rights of access are interpreted to have
no teeth, then the U.S. is failing to achieve the purposes of the Hague
Convention and is abandoning the agreement it made with other
contracting states. The U.S. has a very significant interest in the
enforcement of its own custody orders abroad and expects that other
nations will stand behind these orders. For this international cooperative
effort to succeed, the U.S. must follow suit and permit its courts to
enforce other nations' custody orders in the most reasonable and prompt
manner, so that fleeing parents will not find a "friendlier forum" in the
United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Hague Convention's enforcement provisions in rights of
access cases are vague and thus may possibly be interpreted as lacking a
judicial remedy, the plain language of ICARA unambiguously confers
state courts and federal courts jurisdiction over ICARA actions, without
any distinction between access claims and return claims. The Fourth
Circuit's analysis in Cantor v. Cohen fails to sufficiently justify its
denial of a private right of action in access cases. In addition to
ICARA's explicit mention of the applicable judicial procedures in
access cases, the determinations required to decide access cases are well
within the domain of state and federal courts and do not encroach upon
the province of state domestic relations courts. Denying the left-behind
parent the opportunity to pursue both ICARA remedies concurrently
forces that parent to splinter the case into two separate courts. The
140. The Hague Convention, supra note 5, at art. 11.
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Cantor approach prohibits the enforcement of rights of access under the
Hague Convention-rights that Congress intended to protect in ICARA.
Finally, the Second Circuit's approach in Ozaltin v. Ozaltin conforms to
the spirit of the Hague Convention. Providing a private right of action
in access cases ensures that U.S. law is not incentivizing parents,
dissatisfied with another country's custody order, to escape the force of
that order by fleeing to the United States. Most importantly, if the left-
behind parent is able to promptly receive an order enforcing rights of
access, the damage to the child's long-term relationship with both
parents can be curtailed. For these important policy reasons as well as
for international treaty interpretation issues, the issue of a private right
of action, pursuant to ICARA, for rights of access cases is ripe for
review by the United States Supreme Court.
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